People like Andrew Sullivan (gratuitous cheap shot at Sullivan) like to talk about putting more troops on the ground in Iraq as if this is as simple as Yul Brenner bringing his fist to his chest and saying "So it is written, so it is done."
Armor up the Humvees? So it is written, so it is done. By the way, after you armor up those Humvees, can you still transport the same number of them on a C-130? How much fuel do they eat? Does the drive train still work the same way with all the extra weight? How about the tires?
It really ain't that simple, folks. Logistics and force structure dictate tactics. Always have, always will.
Wretchard examines the problem of divisions versus brigades, and concludes that this is difficult stuff.
I know this, somewhat first hand. I have a brother who worked on these things in the army, who has an IQ of something like 170 and a photographic memory. He's up for promotion to bird colonel this month, which is probably going to happen, but in the manner of all these things, is best not to expect. He is moving into the senior ranks of the Army's middle management. He's by no means the foremost guy to have worked on this problem. He tells me that there are some really smart people working on this -- and when he says "really smart", he means people smarter than him by an order of magnitude, which is something like 3 orders of magnitude of smartness beyond where I am -- a guy who can barely debug Movable Type, fer chrissakes. He tells me that changing force structure is difficult. I believe him.
The Army faces a lot of challenges. First and foremost is that your force structure for taking out the Republican Guard looks somewhat different than your force structure for taking out terrorist cells. Rummy is trying to build the latter while not breaking the former. All the while, you need to put the former in the field, and tell them to do their best while they're getting shot at.
Armchair generals can blithely say "the Humvees should be armored" or "We should have anticipated this". Indeed, Rumsfeld is guilty of many sins. Among them are his lack of omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence. And from the point of view of absolute foreknowledge of the future, well, he frankly sucks.
You can always tell an armchair general, because they routinely expect perfection worthy of John Calvin's God. Sullivan (gratuitous cheap shot at Sullivan) expects not only military and logistical perfection, but he also expects moral perfection. A person with military experience looks at Abu Ghraib ("Abu Ghraib!" wails Sullivan) and says "Looks like a few reservists got out of hand. Court martial the lot of 'em and relieve the chain of command." Practical solution to a real world problem. Archair generals look at Abu Ghraib and either wail about Rummy's lack of omniscience, or assume that his omniscience makes him complicit in the crime.
People who have served in the military are a little more practical. They do not expect perfection. They are pleased with simple competence. They understand that anything short of Fredericksburg probably means that you're moving forward in a positive way.
The situation in Iraq is difficult. It's a nasty little war. But we can at least thank Tommy Franks for fighting a good conventional campaign, because if we had lost the blitzkrieg, we wouldn't have the luxury of fighting against a mere insurgency.
Stop wailing, people. Persistence.